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Abstract
This paper tests the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale model using panel data from
U.S. food processing industries with endogenous protection, import penetration, and
political campaign. The results support the key predictions of the model: organized
industries are granted higher protection that decreases with import penetration and the
price elasticity of imports.  Furthermore, the presence of import quotas raises the level of
protection substantially. The estimated weight on aggregate welfare is strikingly similar
those found by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandopadhyay (2000),
implying that protection is not for sale in these industries.
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TESTING PROTECTION FOR SALE IN THE FOOD INDUSTRIES
Introduction
The most influential of the last wave of conceptual models of the political economy
of trade policy is the “Protection for Sale” model developed by Grossman and Helpman
(1994, henceforth G-H).  Its main contribution is to provide micro-foundations to the
behavior of policymakers and organized lobbies and crisp predictions of the determinants
of the structure of trade protection.   So far, however, only two studies have explicitly
tested its predictions (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999, henceforth G-M; Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay, 2000, henceforth G-B).  
Both G-M and G-B attempt to deal with two weaknesses of their data.  One is the use
of coverage ratios to measure trade barrier protection.  Another is the use of external
information on the price elasticities of imports, taken from  Shiells, Stern and Deardoff
(1986). In addition, both studies use cross-section rather than panel data, which provide a
picture of protection at a given point in time. 
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This article tests the “Protection for Sale” model using panel data from the U.S. food
processing industries at the 4-digit SIC level (more disaggregated data than previous
studies). It also uses actual tariff rates and import-quota tariff equivalents instead of NTB
coverage ratios as well as import elasticities estimated within the same model and data.
Finally, this article also presents further results separating out the impact of tariff vs.
import quotas to assess the impact of instrument choice on the level of protection. The
results provide further support for the G-H model and the estimated welfare weights are
consistent with those estimated by G-M and G-B. 2
 The Protection for Sale Model
In the G-H model (summarized here only for exposition purposes), politicians value
both the total level of political contributions and the aggregate well-being of the
population.  The latter can be expressed either net (excluding) or gross (including) of
contributions. As in G-M, the government’s objective function (
G U ) is assumed to be a
linear, weighted average of general welfare (W) (net of contributions) and contributions
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where θ ∈ [0,1] is the weight given to general welfare vs. campaign contributions, L
represents the set of politically organized sectors, and W includes tariffs and represents
the sum of indirect utilities over all sectors, organized and unorganized.  Using the
concept of “truthful” contributions under the framework of Berheim and Whinston
(1986), let  i W , the welfare of the organized sector i, replace  i C  in equation (1) to obtain


























where   i t  is an ad valorem tariff rate in industry i,  I  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the industry is politically organized (0, otherwise),  L α  is the proportion of the population
represented by a lobby,  )) 1 /( ( θ θ − = a  is the weight the government attaches to general
welfare (gross of contributions) in relation to total contributions,  i Z  is the ratio of3
domestic output to imports, and  i e   is the absolute value of the price elasticity of import
demand.  
From (2), the G-H model yields two crisp predictions to be tested:  (1) industries
that are not politically organized face negative rates of protection while industries that are
organized are granted protection; (2) for the protected industries, the level of protection is
negatively related to the price elasticity of imports and to import penetration.  The result
that protection levels are inversely related to import penetration is, of course, contrary to
the traditional view of trade protection (e.g., Anderson, 1980; Lee and Swagel, 1997).
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Empirical Model
Equation (2) provides the basis for empirical specification.  Adding an error term  i ε
to make the equation stochastic, the empirical analogy of equation (2) is
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where ) /( L L a α α δ + − =  and  ) /( 1 L a α γ + = . Note that according to the G-H model, it is
expected that δ<0,  γ >0 and δ + γ >0.  From δ and γ one can derive the weights on
aggregate welfare net or gross of contributions (θ and a, respectively). Note also that
there are only three explanatory variables:  , , i i e Z  and  i I .
Recent work has underscored the necessity of endogenizing import penetration
(the inverse of  i Z ) in the determination of trade barriers (Trefler, 1993; Lee and Swagel,
1997).  We use a modified Armington model, both to endogenize import penetration and
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where  mi di P P /  is the domestic to import price ratio, t is a trend variable and  i V  represents
other variable shifters,  i β ’s are parameters to be estimated, and  i u  is an error term.  The
price elasticity of import demand (in positive values) is given by  ] ln [ 2 1 t ei β β + = .
Thus, the right hand side variables in this equation consist of the domestic to import price
ratio, a trend variable shifter, and the annual rate of change of the industry value of
shipments, which represents a proxy to the business cycle (Field and Pagoulatos, 1998).
Finally, in this article, political organization is taken as given. Several attempts to
endogenize  i I  failed to provide additional information or improve the results.
3 
The Data 
Annual time series data (1978-92) from 34 food processing industries at the 4-digit
1972 SIC level were used to operationalize the empirical model. Due to data availability
limitation constraints, the 1972 (instead of the 1987) SIC definitions were used.  Data
translation tables were used for the cases where only the 1987 SIC or USITC data were
available.  Finally, a handful of industries were excluded due to missing data on import
prices. 
The values of imports at the 4-digit SIC level were taken from Feenstra (1996).
Average tariff rates were computed by dividing total duties collected by CIF import
values from a tape supplied by the US International Trade Commission (1978-90) and its
website (dataweb.usitc.gov) for 1991-92. Tariff-rate equivalents were used for industries
protected by import quotas (sugar, meat packing, and the dairy industries). The tariff-rate5
equivalents were taken from two reports of the U.S. International Trade Commission
(1990a, 1990b) and a U.S. Department of Agriculture (1994) report.
4
The variable  i Z  was computed by dividing the value of domestic output by the value
of imports deflated by their respective (output and import) price indexes. The NBER
data-base on manufacturing productivity by Barstelman and Gray (1996) provided the
values of domestic output and associated output price indexes.  
Data on import prices at the 4-digit SIC level are not readily available.  However, the
FAO website and Foreign Agricultural Trade (USDA, various years) databases provided
data on quantity and price for most processed agricultural products.  Import price indexes
were constructed by aggregating products by SIC definitions and by weighting available
quantity and price values.
5 
Following G-M, the political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions to
congressional candidates were used to construct the political organization variable  i I  by
assigning PAC contributions to 4-digit SIC codes.
 The PAC data came from four reports
of the U.S. Federal Election Commission (1978-94) encompassing election cycles. Then
the ratios of contributions over total food-industry contributions were calculated for the
1978-92 period and sorted in an ascending order. The variable  i I  took a value of zero for
the first (lowest) quartile of observations to represent unorganized sectors/years
combinations and took a value of 1 for the remaining observations. 
Once all the data were operational, equations (3) and (4) were estimated
simultaneously using nonlinear 3SLS and the SHAZAM 7.0 software. Note that import
penetration is endogeneous and  i e  is an explanatory variable in the tariff equation.  The
estimation was first carried out at the single industry level in order to obtain estimates of6
the price elasticity of demand for each industry.  Then equation (3) is re-estimated with
pooled data including import elasticity estimates. An extended model includes a dummy
variable for industries protected by import quotas to assess the impact of policy
instrument choice on the level of protection.
Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the estimates for price elasticity of imports for each industry,
obtained via the joint estimation of equations (4) and (5).  Table 2 presents the welfare
weight parameters for single industries while Table 3 presents the pooled results for all
industries in the sample.  
Note that the estimated import price elasticities vary with time  ) ln ˆ ˆ ˆ ( 2 1 t ei β β + =  and
that only their mean values are presented in Table 1. Only four out of 34 industry
coefficients did not have the expected sign.
6 The results for those four industries are not
presented and they were also excluded from the pooled estimation.  Of the 30 industries
that have the expected sign, 23 mean elasticity coefficients (77%) were statistically
significant at the 95% level.   Thus, the results appear plausible in terms of the signs and
magnitudes of the price elasticities of import demand.
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for δ  and γ  for each industry.  Since the
estimated δ is generally negative while the estimated γ is positive, the results confirm
expectations. Among the organized industries, it is of interest to assess the weight the
government attaches to aggregate welfare (θ) compared to campaign contributions (1-θ).
Two tests of the welfare weight were conducted. The first test hypothesized that the
government does not care about welfare. In 93% of the cases, the null hypothesis that θ =
0 was rejected at the 95% level. The second test, which hypothesized that the government7
is a pure welfare maximizer (θ = 1), yielded mixed results.  The null hypothesis was
rejected in 40% of the industries.   
The results from the pooled data of 30 food industries are summarized in Table 3.  A
second version of the model included a dummy variable indicating the presence of a non-
tariff barrier (i.e., an import quota). As Lopez and Pagoulatos (1996) found, the use of
import quotas might result in higher levels of protection, as their use may be more
politically expedient than the more transparent tariff rates.
All coefficients are statistically significant at the 95% level.  The results also coincide
with the predictions of the G-H model, i.e. δ<0, γ>0 and δ+ γ >0, meaning that organized
sectors receive protection and unorganized sectors are taxed. G-M found weak support
for the latter results with respect to unorganized sectors.  Clearly, protection positively
varies with  ) / ( i i e Z  in the organized sectors.  These results provide further support for
the fundamental predictions of the G-H model beyond the single-industry results.   
From the above parameter estimates, the implied weight (θ) that the government
attaches to aggregate welfare is 0.9987, quite close to the one found by G-M for the U.S.
manufacturing sector (0.986) and the one that can be imputed from G-B's results
(0.9997).
7 It is remarkable that all these three studies yield quite similar weights on net
aggregate welfare vs. campaign contributions, suggesting that protection is not for sale.
 The null hypothesis that the government does not care about aggregate welfare
) 0 ( = θ was rejected at the 5% level. An alternative test (H0: θ = 1), suggesting that the
government is uninfluenced by campaign contributions, was also rejected at the 5% level.
Judging from the magnitude of the welfare weight, the government mostly cares about8
general welfare in setting commercial policy. Judging from the hypotheses tests, the
government is sensitive to both aggregate welfare and campaign contributions.
The relative weight placed on aggregate welfare is rather large (a = 776) but lower
than the one found by G-B for the whole manufacturing sector (3175).   As rightly
observed by G-B, high values of a imply that the relative weight placed on gross
aggregate welfare versus the weight placed on campaign contributions is close. However,
a high value of a is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for such a conclusion.
8
When the basic G-H model is augmented with the import quota dummy variable, the
parameter estimates δ and γ display the same coefficient signs, though somewhat lower in
magnitude. The welfare weights continue to be significantly different from 0 and θ
significantly different from 1 at the 95% level. Thus, the results continue to support the
G-H model predictions.  The quota-dummy coefficient is statistically significant,
indicating policymakers' bias towards raising the level of protection where an import
quota is in place.
9 More specifically, given that other conditions remain the same, the
government will increase trade protection by 80% when using an import quota in lieu of a
tariff. 
Summary and Conclusions
 This article tests the predictions of the Protection for Sale model for the structure of
protection in the U.S. food processing industries using more direct measures of tariff
rates and more disaggregated data than previous work, namely the studies by Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). In addition, the price
elasticity of imports is determined within the same model and (panel) data. 9
The empirical results for both single industries and pooled data strongly support the
key predictions of the G-H model with regard to the structure of trade protection.
Organized sectors are granted protection while unorganized sectors suffer negative
protection (the latter found only weakly in Goldberg and Maggi's study). Unequivocally,
protection is negatively related to import penetration and the price elasticity of import
demand within the organized sectors.    
 From the pooled results, the parameter estimate for θ is close to its upper limit
(around 0.998) and is between the one found by Goldberg and Maggi (0.986) and the one
imputed from Gawande and Bandyopadyay (0.9997), indicating that the government
places a heavier weight on aggregate welfare net of contributions vis-à-vis campaign
contributions. The parameter estimate for a is large (between 776 and 2006) and in the
same range as the one presented by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (3,175). 
The results from all three studies still beg the question raised by G-B as to why
empirically the G-H model yields such high weights on aggregate welfare, suggesting
that protection is not for sale. A particular assumption that is at odds with empirical
observation is the one on "truthful contributions" which implies that industries render all
welfare gains from trade as campaign contributions. For example, trade policy benefits to
the U.S. food industries have been estimated at approximately $32.9 billion in 1987
(Lopez and Pagoulatos, 1994) while these industries contributed only $8.2 million to
congressional candidates in the 1987-88 election cycle. Industry welfare gains were,
therefore, about 4,000 larger than campaign contributions.10
Footnotes
1G-M present several specifications to correct for heteroscedasticity for their NTB
coverage ratios. G-B focus instead on error-corrections for the import price elasticities.
While G-M use cross-section data for the manufacturing sector at the 3-digit SIC level,
G-B use 4-digit SIC data for 1983.
2Likewise, Trefler (1993) finds that the growth of import penetration leads to higher
levels of protection. Grossman and Helpman argue that this and other similar results are
due to ignoring the price elasticity of imports and point out the lack of theoretical
underpinning guiding those results.
3The specification of the discrete variable for political organization is given below.
To endogenize that variable, an additional equation was specified based on the work of
Mitra (1999), Grier (1991) and others who emphasize industrial concentration, capital
stock, geographic dispersion, and employment characteristics. Because of the failure to
improve and in some cases the deterioration of the results of interest for the sample at
hand, political organization is taken as exogeneously determined. A related issue for
estimation involving a single industry is that the political organization variable is often
constant (Ii = 0 or Ii = 1) during the time span considered, collapsing the estimation in (3)
to one parameter  δ ( or  γ δ + ).
4We are grateful to Frederick Nelson of USDA's Economic Research Service for
providing updated data on tariff-rate equivalents of import quotas.
5We are grateful to professors Elena Lopez and Emilio Pagoulatos for furnishing
their import price indexes for the 1972-87 period.  These price indexes were extrapolated
adopting their methodology (Lopez and Pagoulatos, 2001).11
6The exceptions are Condensed and Evaporated Milk (SIC 2023), Cane Sugar
Refining (2062), Bottled & Canned Soft Drinks (2086), and Flavor Syrup Extracts
(2087).
7From the G-H model, the government’s objective function is  aW C G + = ,
which is equivalent to  ) ( 2 1
~
C W a C a G − + = W a C a a 2 2 1 ) ( + − =  with  ) /( 2 1 2 a a a a − =
provided that  2 1 a a > . This is the interpretation followed by G-B. Since ais unbounded
but homogeneous of degree zero with respect to the scale of  1 a and  2 a , a sensible
assumption is to follow G-M and normalize  1 a =1 and let  2 a =θ  provided that  θ > 1 ( a
restatement of  2 1 a a > ). Thus,  ) 1 /( a a + = θ  is used to calculate the weight to be
compared to G-M.  
8Following the notation in footnote 7, if  ε + = 2 1 a a , then  2 1 a a −  is quite small
relative to  2 a , leading to a large relative weight aas G-B found. This is equivalent to
saying that  θ − 1  is small. The upper limit of a is not bounded and large values of a
could be taken, as G-B did, as evidence of nearly equal importance of campaign
contributions vs. aggregate welfare gross of (including) campaign contributions.
However, campaign contributions appear in both terms whose weight we are trying to
assess. Using the term amakes it confusing to test pure aggregate welfare maximization
on the part of the government (a rejection of any kind of protection for sale). Thus, θ  is
taken as the reference weight to test the protection for sale hypothesis.
9As in G-M and G-B, this article does not address the problem of policy
instrument choice (tariff vs. quota). In previous estimations, the quota dummy variable
was introduced in alternative ways such as a slope shifter (of Zi/eI) or as a weight shifter.12
The results presented in Table 3 are more plausible. One fact that hampered endogeneous
estimation of the quota dummy was the sparcity of data, as import quotas were used in
only a handful of industries. According to the Chicago School, policy instrument choices
are driven by efficiency considerations, as in the use of quantitative restrictions for
commodities that have a relatively low elasticity of demand (vs. supply elasticity), as
argued by Gardner (1987). This is certainly the case in sugar and dairy products in the
sample, both of which are protected primarily through import quotas.13
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Table 1.  Parameter Estimates for Import Elasticities
SIC β1 T-value β2 T-value Mean Elasticity (ei) T-value
2011  Meat Packing Plants 0.5886 6.793 -0.1287 3.786 0.3492 3.4714 ***
2013  Sausage & Prepared Meats 0.4583 3.661 -0.0327 1.984 0.3975 15.543 ***
2016  Poultry Dressing Plants 0.7016 0.958 0.0845 0.874 0.8587 12.995 ***
2017  Poultry & Egg Processing 1.1354 11.890 0.1124 1.427 1.3445 15.294 ***
2021  Creamery Butter 1.7121 10.258 -0.5068 7.899 0.7694 1.941 ***
2022  Cheese, Natural and Processed  0.8480 2.443 0.1850 6.731 1.1920 8.242 ***
2026  Fluid Milk 0.7513 2.738 -0.1042 1.621 0.5574 6.839 ***
2032  Canned Specialties 2.1309 6.776 0.4199 4.348 2.9118 8.869 ***
2033  Canned Fruits & Vegetables 2.3506 5.105 -0.6992 3.984 1.050 1.921 **
2034  Dried & Dehydrated Fruits & Vegetables     1.2118 2.862 -0.2453 3.209 0.7556 3.940 ***
2035  Pickled Sauces & Salad Dressing -11.307 6.660 7.0116 7.451 1.7342 0.316
2037  Frozen Specialties 7.2622 8.154 -3.2271 7.215 1.260 0.499
2041  Flour & Grain Mill Products 0.3353 1.835 -0.0508 1.902 0.2408 6.062 ***
2043  Cereal Preparations 3.7768 8.110 -1.3864 8.304 1.1982 1.105
2044  Rice Milling -0.0258 0.071 1.7786 14.461 3.2823 2.360 ***
2046  Wet Corn Milling 2.0744 4.116 0.2654 2.927 2.5681 12.372 ***
2048  Prepared Feeds 0.7818 10.003 0.3059 10.268 1.3507 5.647 ***
2051  Bread & Bakery Products 83.317 1.288 -41.009 1.304 7.0423 0.220
2061  Raw Cane Sugar 1.0217 26.333 -0.0774 4.834 0.8777 14.503 ***16
Table 1. (Continued)
SIC β1 T-value β2 T-value Mean Elasticity (ei) T-value
2065  Candy & Confectionery Products 0.7938 7.647 0.3382 5.065 1.4228 5.380 ***
2066  Chocolate & Cocoa Products 0.6055 4.260 -0.2195 4.055 0.1972 1.149
2067  Chewing Gum 0.6543 2.746 -0.1524 2.507 0.3708 3.111 ***
2074  Cottonseed Oil Mills 0.2860 0.724 0.3899 6.687 1.0112 3.3167 ***
2076  Vegetable Oil Mills -0.0187 0.305 0.3277 6.005 0.5908 2.306 ***
2082  Malt Liquors -1.4105 3.098 0.7886 3.102 0.0562 0.091
2084  Wine & Brandy Spirits 1.0299 8.162 0.0961 5.097 1.2087 16.079 ***
2085  Distilled Liquor Except Brandy 1.3427 13.837 0.0248 0.899 1.3888 71.624 ***
2091 Canned & Cured Seafood 7.7746 9.314 -2.0165 6.761 4.024 2.552 ***
2095  Roasted Coffee Processors 0.3997 5.045 0.1630 5.907 0.7028 5.515 ***
2098  Macaroni & Spaghetti  -2.6537 0.500 1.808 0.498 0.7082 0.50117
Table 2.  Welfare Weight Parameter Estimates: Results for Single Industries
SIC δ T-value γ T-value θ s.e. a s.e.
2011  Meat Packing Plants -0.000176 1.536 0.0000339 0.549 0.99997 *** 0.0000618  29499 53758
2013  Sausage & Prepared Meats -0.0000957 3.459
2016  Poultry Dressing Plants 0.0000124 0.855
2017  Poultry & Egg Processing -0.00000204 1.834
2021  Creamery Butter -0.000301 0.706 0.000355 2.928 0.99964 *** 0.000121  2814.5 *** 961.49
2022  Cheese, Natural and Processed  -0.00473 0551 0.0115 3.005 0.98856 *** 0.00379  86.39 *** 28.908
2026  Fluid Milk 0.0436 0.826 -0.183 0.911 1.0178 *** 0.019  -57.166 59.901
2032  Canned Specialties 0.000049 1.486
2033  Canned Fruits & Vegetables -0.0148 2.677 -0.00073 0.054 1.0007 *** 0.0137  -1347.8 24861
2034  Dried & Dehydrated Fruits & Veg.    -0.000398 2.114
2035  Pickled Sauces & Salad Dressing -0.0000073 0.098
2037  Frozen Specialties -0.13697 -1.161 0.13333 1.1277 0.86618 *** 0.11864  6.473 6.625
2041  Flour & Grain Mill Products 0.000335 0.656 -0.000504 1.113 1.0005 *** 0.000453 -1984.1 1781.8
2043  Cereal Preparations 0.00000359 1.242
2044  Rice Milling 0.00000037 0.070
2046  Wet Corn Milling -0.0015051 2.645
2048  Prepared Feeds 0.000128 6.50318
Table 2. (Continued)
SIC δ T-value γ T-value θ s.e. a s.e.
2051  Bread & Bakery Products 0.001039 1.724
2061  Raw Cane Sugar -1.6172 2.682 1.9618 3.067 -0.45903 0.45419  -0.3146 0.2134
2065  Candy & Confectionery Products -0.000617 4.939 0.0000826 1.029 0.99992 *** 0.000080 12102 11764
2066  Chocolate & Cocoa Products -0.0000074 0.108
2067  Chewing Gum 0.0000396 1.563
2074  Cottonseed Oil Mills -0.000136 0.696
2076  Vegetable Oil Mills -0.00196 0.302
2082  Malt Liquors -0.000379 2.579 0.000383 2.498 0.99962 *** 0.000153 2608.1 *** 1044.6
2084  Wine & Brandy Spirits -0.00138 1.432 -0.00417 6.199 1.0042 *** 0.000676 -239.67 38.487
2085  Distilled Liquor Except Brandy 0.00727 2.933 -0.00739 3.611 1.0074 *** 0.00207 -136.22 37.812
2091 Canned & Cured Seafood -0.02668 4.783
2095  Roasted Coffee Processors -0.0000079 3.589
2098  Macaroni & Spaghetti  -0.000072 0.42219
Table 3.  Pooled Estimation Results

















































Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscript "a" indicates that the number was
derived from the authors' published results.The G-M result presented is the one for µ=1 (no
multiple of the coverage ratio if it is between zero and one). The coefficient θ only changed to
0.984 and 0.981 for µ=2 and 3, respectively.